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COMMENT 
DUTY TO WARN AND THE SOPHISTICATED USER DEFENSE 
IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES 
The sophisticated user defense provides a defense to manufacturers in 
products liability failure to warn cases. The defense is premised on the 
theory that a manufacturer has no duty to warn users of the product who 
have the sophisticated knowledge necessary to understand the risks associ-
ated with use of the product. Courts are in disagreement, however, as to 
the validity of this defense in failure to warn actions. In this comment, the 
author traces the development of products liability law and analyzes the 
application of Restatement (Second) of Torts sections 388 and 402A in 
failure to warn cases. The author discusses the use of the defense by asbes-
tos manufacturers and examines the validity of the defense in Maryland. 
Finally, the author proposes the elimination of strict liability failure to 
warn actions. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Although no one statute or court decision has single-handedly 
changed the face of products liability law,l various small developments in 
the area of products liability have amounted to a legal revolution.2 One 
of the most important changes occurred in 1962 when the California 
Supreme Court recognized a new cause of action in products liability 
cases, namely, strict liability in tort. 3 Since the adoption of strict liability 
in tort, courts have struggled to balance the competing interests of indi-
viduals injured by defective products and the interests of manufacturers 
in producing and marketing products that are valuable to society. An 
issue that is becoming increasingly important in this area of law is the 
validity of the sophisticated user defense. Although the defense was rec-
ognized many years ago,4 it was rarely used until its recent emergence as 
a defense in asbestos litigation cases. Another major change in the law of 
produCts liability could evolve as more courts recognize this defense in 
strict liability actions. 
This comment begins with an overview of the developments of prod-
ucts liability law in the United States. It then focuses on the validity of 
the sophisticated user defense in causes of action based on a manufac-
turer's duty to warn under theories of strict liability and negligence. Par-
ticular emphasis is placed on the courts' analyses of this duty to warn 
under the Restatement (Second) of Torts sections 388 and 402A, and 
how such analyses affect a court's willingness to accept the sophisticated 
user defense. The comment then discusses the use of that defense in suits 
1. R. EpSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 3 (1980). 
2.Id. 
3. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 
697 (1962). 
4. Rosebrock v. General Electric Co., 236 N.Y. 227, 140 N.E. 571 (1923). 
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against asbestos manufacturers and examines the validity of the sophisti-
cated user defense in Maryland. Finally, the comment proposes the elim-
ination of failure to warn actions under Restatement (Second) of Torts 
section 402A as a cause of action in products liability cases. 
II. BACKGROUND: DEVELOPMENT OF STRICT LIABILITY 
A. The Evolution of Strict Liability 
Products liability is the legal theory that holds manufacturers and 
sellers of chattels strictly liable to third parties for injuries caused by the 
chattels.s At common law, a manufacturer or seller of a chattel was lia-
ble only to those with whom he was in privity of contract;6 however, the 
privity requirement quickly became riddled with exceptions. The courts 
began eliminating the privity requirement by extending the liability of 
manufacturers to any third party injured by products that were "inher-
ently dangerous" to human safety.? This exception to the privity require-
ment was expanded even further when the New York Court of Appeals 
held in MacPherson v. Buick Motor CO.8 that privity was not required 
where there was a "negligently made product which [was] inherently 
dangerous."9 Similarly, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in Henning-
sen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 10 concluded that privity was no longer 
required in products liability cases based on breach of warranty. The 
court held that a warranty runs with the goods from the manufacturer to 
the ultimate purchaser of the product as well as to anyone who could 
reasonably be expected to use the product. I I Therefore, lack of privity 
was no longer a defense for a manufacturer in a suit by an individual 
injured by the manufacturer's product. As Professor Prosser noted, the 
5. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 98, 
at 1692-94 (5th ed. 1984). 
6. Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842) (reasoning that the requirement 
of privity of contract would eliminate outrageous consequences that would occur if 
liability of sellers and manufacturers was extended beyond the scope of the 
contract). 
7. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852). Although courts adopted this exception 
to the privity requirement, uncertainty arose when deciding which products were 
inherently dangerous to human safety. The courts usually limited application of this 
exception to special products such as food, dangerous weapons, mislabeled drugs, 
and explosives. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON 
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 96, at 682 (5th ed. 1984). 
8.217 N.Y. 382,111 N.E. 1050 (1916). 
9. Id. at 389-95, 111 N.E. at 1053-55. Justice Cardozo, writing for the New York 
Court of Appeals, stopped one step short of adopting strict liability. The opinion 
provided that an injured party no longer was required to be in privity with the 
manufacturer in order to sustain a cause of action against that manufacturer; how-
ever, the injured party was still required to prove negligence on the part of the 
manufacturer. Id. 
10. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). 
11. Id. at 384, 161 A.2d at 84. The court based its holding on the grossly unequal 
bargaining power between manufacturers and consumers. /d. at 373-84, 161 A.2d 
at 78-84. 
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"citadel of privity" had fallen, and "what followed was the most rapid 
and altogether spectacular overturn of an established rule of law in the 
entire history of the law of tortS."12 
The evolution of the common law requirement of privity of contract 
reached its peak when the Supreme Court of California in Greenman v. 
Yuba Power Products, Inc., 13 recognized strict liability in tort as a viable 
cause of action in a products liability case. 14 Not only did the court hold 
that privity of contract no longer is required in a products liability case, 
it also ruled that an injured plaintiff is no longer required to prove negli-
gence or breach of warranty. 15 The court concluded that a manufacturer 
is strictly liable in tort for every product it places in the stream of com-
merce containing a defect that causes an injury to an individual who 
could reasonably be expected to use that product. 16 
More than a decade after Greenman, the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land refused to accept this strict liability theory.J7 In 1976, however, 
fourteen years after Greenman, the Court of Appeals of Maryland recog-
nized strict liability in tort in Phipps v. General Motors Corp. IS The court 
held that a manufacturer of automobiles is strictly liable in tort for inher-
ently dangerous design and manufacturing defects in its products. 19 In 
Phipps, the Court of Appeals of Maryland joined the majority of jurisdic-
tions by recognizing strict liability in tort. 20 
B. Application of Strict Liability in Products Liability Cases 
The language of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of 
12. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 97, 
at 690-92 (5th ed. 1984). 
13. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962). 
14. Id. at 62-64, 377 P.2d at 900-02, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700-02. In Yuba, the plaintiff was 
injured when a piece of wood flew from a defective power tool he was using, striking 
him in the head. Id. at 61, 377 P.2d at 898, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 698. Justice Traynor, 
writing for the court, concluded that it was not a matter of warranty or negligence, 
but simply a matter of strict liability in tort. Id. at 62-64, 377 P.2d at 900-02, 27 
Cal. Rptr. at 700-02. 
IS. Id. at 62-64, 377 P.2d at 900-01, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700-01. 
16. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700. 
17. See Volkswagen v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974) (On a certified ques-
tion of law from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland rejected strict liability, holding that a manufacturer 
could be held liable only for a design defect based on principles of negligence.); see 
also Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 336 A.2d 118 (1975), appeal 
after remand, 278 Md. 304, 363 A.2d 460 (1976) (Applying the principles set forth 
in Young, the court held that a manufacturer is not strictly liable for defects. A 
manufacturer is required only to produce products with a reasonable measure of 
safety.). 
18. 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976). 
19. Id. at 340-46, 363 A.2d at 957-63. 
20. See L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A[3] n.2 (1985) (list-
ing states that have adopted § 402A); see also Robb, A Practical Approach to Use of 
State of the Art Evidence in Strict Liability Cases, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. I, 9 n.29 
(1982) (listing states that have expressly adopted § 402A in case law). 
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Torts,2) (section 402A), relied upon by both the Greenman court and the 
Phipps court, indicates that the paramount issue in a strict liability case is 
whether the product had an unreasonably dangerous defect when it left 
the manufacturer's control. A product can be unreasonably dangerous in 
three ways: (1) it can be designed defectively; (2) it can be manufactured 
defectively; or (3) it can be sold without adequate warnings, or any warn-
ing at all, of the dangers associated with its use.22 Section 402A focuses 
primarily on the condition of the product and not on the reasonableness 
of the manufacturer's actions as in a negligence suit.23 Despite this dis-
tinction between negligence and strict liability in tort, various courts 
have defined "unreasonably dangerous defect" by use of a reasonable 
person standard: a product has an unreasonably dangerous defect when 
a reasonable person would not put the product into the stream of com-
merce with knowledge of its harmful character.24 Use of the phrase "rea-
sonable person" to define unreasonably dangerous defects has 
consequently caused some confusion in strict liability actions and negli-
gence actions.25 
Although strict liability actions arising from design defects, manu-
facturing defects, and failure to warn are all based on section 402A, each 
is conceptually different.26 In theory, manufacturers can produce fault-
free products; therefore, manufacturers who fail to produce fault-free 
products are held strictly liable for any design defects27 or manufacturing 
defects independent of whether the manufacturers actually knew of the 
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Section 402A states: 
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Con-
sumer: (1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably 
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability 
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to 
his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a 
product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer 
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold; (2) The rule 
stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all 
possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or 
consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual 
relation with the seller. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (emphasis added). 
22. See Robb, supra note 20, at 10. 
23. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comments g & i (1965) 
(section 402A applies only where the condition of the product makes it unreasonably 
dangerous to the consumer). 
24. See Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1973); Phillips v. 
Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 492-94, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036-37 (1974). 
25. See infra notes 93-116 and accompanying text. 
26. See generally Keeton, The Meaning of Defect in Products Liability Law - A Review 
of Basic Principles, 45 Mo. L. REV. 579, 585-88 (1980) (discussing differences and 
similarities between the three types of strict liability actions); Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 
239, 243 (1973). 
27. See Keeton supra note 26, at 585-88. For a discussion on the six major tests used in 
deciding whether a product's design is inadequate or defective, see Davison, The 
Uncertain Search for a Design Defect Standard, 30 Am. U. L. Rev. 643, 646-47 
(1981). 
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particular defects. 28 
A manufacturer's liability for failure to warn, unlike liability for de-
sign defects or manufacturing defects, is based on both negligence and 
strict liability principles.29 Under a negligence theory, a manufacturer is 
liable when it has acted unreasonably in failing to warn of any potential 
dangers associated with its product that are either known, or should have 
been known, to the manufacturer. 3o Under principles of strict liability, a 
manufacturer is strictly liable for failing to warn of any potential dangers 
associated with the product based on the theory that the product, with-
out an adequate warning, is unreasonably dangerous. 31 Under either the-
ory, a manufacturer has a duty to warn potential users of its product of 
all reasonably foreseeable dangers. 32 This duty, based on public policy, 
was created because a manufacturer, at relatively little expense, can pro-
vide warnings that will assist consumers in avoiding potential harm. 33 
Numerous courts have either expressly or impliedly ruled that a manu-
facturer is required to act reasonably in the marketing of its products and 
is strictly liable when the product, without an adequate warning, is 
deemed unreasonably dangerous.34 Once again, use of the word "reason-
able" by the courts in strict liability actions narrows any possible distinc-
tion between negligent and strict liability failure to warn. 
A manufacturer's duty to warn arises when the manufacturer knows 
of a possible danger associated with the use of a product or when the 
manufacturer reasonably should be expected to know of the danger by 
virtue of the manufacturer's special skill or knowledge. 35 Once this duty 
has been established, various factors are considered in determining the 
sufficiency of a warning; the content of the warning, the severity of the 
danger, and the knowledge and expertise of the consumer who will be 
28. See Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 492-94, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036-37 
(1974) (strict liability imposes on manufacturers constructive knowledge of the con-
dition of the product). 
29. See generally Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 239 (1973). 
30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965). 
31. See id. § 402A comment j (1965). 
32. Pavlides v. Galveston Yacht Basin, Inc., 727 F.2d 330, 338 (5th Cir. 1984); Reyes v. 
Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 498 F.2d 1264, 1274-75 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 
1096 (1974). 
33. Pavlides, 727 F.2d at 338. 
34. Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 127-31 (9th Cir. 1968). See gener-
ally Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 239, 244 (1973). 
35. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965). A manufac-
turer is deemed to know of all the actual and reasonably foreseeable dangers of its 
product at the time the product is marketed; ignorance, although a possible defense 
in a negligence action, is not a valid defense in a strict liability action. Sales, The 
Marketing Defect (Warning and Instructions) In Strict Tort Liability, in DUTY TO 
WARN AND OTHER CURRENT ISSUES 10 (1980). Therefore, manufacturers have an 
obligation to keep abreast with scientific advances that may affect the use and safety 
of the product. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088-91 (5th 
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). 
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subject to risk when using the product.36 A warning should communi-
cate to the reasonable consumer information that would provide the con-
sumer with an opportunity to exercise caution necessary for his 
protection, because the consumer deserves the opportunity to make an 
informed choice as to whether the utility of the product outweighs the 
potential risk of harm. 37 
C. Defenses to Strict Liability Claims Based on a Manufacturer's 
Failure to Warn 
Although strict liability lessens the burden on the plaintiff in a suit 
against a manufacturer for failure to warn,38 a manufacturer is not with-
out defenses. The primary defenses asserted by manufacturers include: 
(1) material changes in the condition of the product by the consumer; (2) 
unreasonable use of the product by the injured party; (3) the "state of the 
art" defense; (4) the patent danger defense; (5) assumption of risk; and 
(6) the "sophisticated user" defense. 
1. Changes in the Condition of the Product 
A manufacturer in a strict liability action has a defense if there has 
been a substantial change in the condition of the product by a third party 
subsequent to the time it left the manufacturer's control,39 or if the user 
of the product has failed to properly maintain the product.40 A manufac-
turer is not liable for improper assembly, misrepair of the product by the 
user, or improper removal of safeguards by the user.41 Similarly, in cer-
tain limited situations where the product is not in its final form when it 
leaves the manufacturer's control, the manufacturer is not liable for any 
defects that occur after the product leaves the manufacturer's 
36. Bumgardner, Warning Problems of the Industrial Machine Manufacturers, in PROD. 
LIAB. LITIGATION 1983, at 336 (1983). 
37. See, e.g., D'Arienzo v. Clairol, Inc., 125 N.J. Super. 224, 230-31, 310 A.2d 106, 110-
11 (1973). For a more detailed discussion on the adequacy of warnings in a strict 
liability actiDn, see Sales, supra note 35, at 13-14. 
38. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62-64, 377 P.2d 897, 900-01, 
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700-01 (1962); see also supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text. 
In a strict liability action based on a manufacturer's failure to warn, a plaintiff 
must prove: (1) the manufacturer knew or should have known of the danger (this 
requirement, however, is easily satisfied because a manufacturer is deemed to know 
of all reasonably foreseeable dangers, see supra note 30 and accompanying text); (2) 
the manufacturer had a duty to warn and breached that duty; and (3) the breach of 
the duty was the proximate cause or, in some jurisdictions, a producing cause of the 
plaintiff's injuries. Sales, supra note 35, at 10-11. 
39. Parsons, Manufacturer Defenses in Product Liability Litigation, in PROD. LIAB. LIT-
IGATION 297 (1983); Kiminez v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 552 F. Supp. 301, 305-
06 (D.C.N.Y. 1981). 
40. See Parsons, supra note 39, at 298. For further discussion of the defense of changes 
in the condition of the product, see W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 102 (5th ed. 1984). 
41. Parsons, supra note 39, at 299-302. 
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possession.42 
2. Defenses Related to Unreasonable Use of the Product by the 
Injured Party 
A manufacturer is not liable when the injured party uses the manu-
facturer's product in an abnormal fashion that is not reasonably foresee-
able to the manufacturer.43 A manufacturer may attempt to raise the 
plaintiff's contributory negligence as a defense; however, in a majority of 
jurisdictions, contributory negligence is not a viable defense in a strict 
liability case.44 In jurisdictions that have adopted comparative negli-
gence principles, contributory negligence is only a partial defense in a 
strict liability action.45 
3. "State of the Art" Defense 
In some jurisdictions, a manufacturer may produce evidence that it 
conformed to the common practice and standards of the industry and 
that its design was in accord with the technological and scientific knowl-
edge of the industry at the time the product was manufactured.46 This 
type of evidence is presented by the manufacturer to support the state of 
the art defense.47 The admissibility of state of the art evidence in strict 
liability actions is not universally recognized.48 
It is well established that the state of the art defense is irrelevant in 
42. [d. at 303. In these limited circumstances, the basis of the manufacturer's defense is 
that he had no control over, and therefore no liability for, the final product. [d. at 
304. 
43. [d. at 310. For further discussion regarding the unreasonable use of the product by 
the injured party, see W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE 
LAW OF TORTS § 102 (5th ed. 1984). 
44. Parsons, supra note 39, at 314. Jurisdictions that reject contributory negligence as a 
defense in strict liability cases reason that because the amount of due care exhibited 
by a manufacturer is irrelevant in a strict liability action, the care used by the in-
jured party likewise is irrelevant. [d. 
In Sheehan v. Anthony Pools, 50 Md. App. 614, 622-26,440 A.2d 1085, 1089-
92 (1982), aff'd, 295 Md. 285, 455 A.2d 434 (1983), the plaintiff brought a products 
liability action based on negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability against 
the manufacturer of a pool for injuries sustained when he fell off the diving board 
and struck the side of the pool. [d. at 615-16, 440 A.2d at 1086-87. The court stated 
that "[o]rdinary contributory negligence does not bar recovery in a strict liability 
action; '[t]he only form of plaintiff's negligence that is a defense to strict liability is 
that which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a 
known danger, more commonly referred to as assumption of risk.'" [d. at 626, 440 
A.2d at 1092 (quoting Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 145, 501 P.2d 1163, 1169, 
104 Cal. Rptr. 443, 449-50 (1972». 
45. Parsons, supra note 39, at 315. 
46. [d. at 305. 
47. For a complete discussion on the state of the art defense, see Funston, Failure to 
Warn Defect in Strict Products Liability: A Paradigmatic Approach to State of the 
Art Evidence and Scientific Knowability, 51 INS. COUNSEL J. 39 (1984); Robb, supra 
note 20; Note, New Jersey Advances the State of the Art in Products Liability: 
Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 15 CONN. L. REV. 661 (1983). 
48. See infra notes 50-56 and accompanying text. 
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strict liability actions based on a manufacturing defect.49 Courts are di-
vided, however, as to whether state of the art is a valid defense in design 
defect cases50 or in strict liability cases based on the manufacturer's fail-
ure to warn. 51 Most courts that reject the state of the art defense base 
their decision on section 402A(2)(a) which states that a manufacturer 
can be strictly liable even if it "has exercised all possible care in the prep-
aration and sale of [the] product."52 These courts conclude that state of 
the art evidence addresses only the issue of a manufacturer's due care, 
which is irrelevant in a strict liability action. 53 Jurisdictions that admit 
state of the art evidence rely on one of two rationales. In some jurisdic-
tions, particularly where a consumer's reasonable expectations is the test 
for defining a defect under section 402A,54 state of the art evidence is 
admitted to measure a consumer's reasonable expectation of product per-
formance and safety. Other jurisdictions admit state of the art evidence 
because a manufacturer is strictly liable only if it knew or should have 
known of the danger. 55 State of the art evidence, therefore, is relevant to 
determine the manufacturer's knowledge at the time the product was 
made. 56 
4. Patent Defect Defense 
The traditional rule is that a manufacturer has no duty to warn of 
dangers that are obvious to the general public. 57 Some courts, however, 
have rejected this "patent" defense and have held manufacturers liable 
for injuries to individuals even where the dangers are obvious (i.e., patent 
dangers).58 In Micallefv. Miehle Co. ,59 the New York Court of Appeals 
adopted this modem trend and held that a manufacturer is "obligated to 
49. Robb, supra note 20, at 10-11; L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 20, at 
16A(4)(f)(iii) n.1. 
50. Robb, supra note 20, at 11-12. 
51. Id. at 12-19. 
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(a) (1965). 
53. See Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809, 812 (9th Cir. 1974); 
Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982); 
Berkebile v. Brantley Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975); see also 
Robb, supra note 20, at 14. 
54. See Robb, supra note 20, at 11; see also Davison, supra note 27, at 649-54. 
55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A commentj (1965); see also Phillips 
v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 492-94, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036-37 (1974) (manu-
facturer may be presumed to know of any potential risk). 
56. See Note, New Jersey Advances the State of the Art in Products Liability: Beshada v. 
Johns-Manville Products Corp., 15 CONN. L. REV. 661, 674-75 (1983). 
57. See generally Phillips, Products Liability: Obviousness of Danger Revisited, 15 IND. 
L. REV. 797 (1982); Leibman & Sandy, Can the Open and Obvious Danger Rule 
Coexist With Strict Tort Product Liability?: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 20 AM. 
Bus. L.J. 299 (1982). 
58. See Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 
(1970); Byrnes v. Economic Mach. Co., 41 Mich. App. 192,200 N.W.2d 104 (1972); 
Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976); 
Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 3 Wash. App. 508,476 P.2d 713 (1970); Phillips, 
supra note 57; Marschall, An Obvious Wrong Does Not Make A Right: Manufactur-
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exercise that degree of care in his plan or design so as to avoid any unrea-
sonable risk of harm to anyone likely to be exposed to danger when the 
product is used in the manner for which the product was intended"60 or 
for any reasonably foreseeable use.6\ 
The manufacturer in Micallef argued that the case should be dis-
missed because the danger in question, removing a foreign object from a 
press machine, was "open and obvious," and therefore, the manufacturer 
had no duty to guard against such a patent defect.62 Although the court 
noted that this argument had "retained its vitalitY,"63 it decided to follow 
the trend of other courts and adopt a more liberal position.64 The court 
reasoned that the traditional rule "suffers from its rigidity in precluding 
recovery whenever it is demonstrated that the defect was patent,"65 and 
that such rigidity may produce harsh, unwarranted results. 66 The court 
determined that in furthering the public interest it was necessary to in-
crease the responsibility of manufacturers who are in a superior position 
to recognize and cure both patent and latent defects.67 
5. Assumption of Risk 
The patent-latent defense is analogous to, but distinct from, another 
commonly used defense in products liability cases: assumption of risk.68 
The defense of assumption of risk is defined by two requirements: (1) the 
plaintiff must know and understand the risk, and (2) the plaintiff must 
freely and voluntarily choose to incur that risk. 69 The standard applied 
in the assumption of risk defense is more SUbjective than in the patent-
latent defense: Did the plaintiff fully understand, and voluntarily choose 
ers' Liability for Patently Dangerous Products, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065, 1091-93 
(1973). 
59. 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976). In Micallef, the plaintiff 
brought a products liability action against the manufacturer of a press machine 
under the theories of negligent design and manufacture and breach of implied war-
ranty. The plaintiff suffered injuries when his hand became caught in the machine 
when he tried to remove a foreign object from the machine. The plaintiff knew of the 
specific danger involved. [d. at 379-80, 348 N.E.2d at 573-74, 384 N. Y.S.2d at 117. 
60. [d. at 385, 348 N.E.2d at 577, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 120 (citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
61. [d. 
62. [d. at 382-83, 348 N.E.2d at 575, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 119. The manufacturer relied on 
the rule oflaw set forth in Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950) 
which recognized the traditional rule that a manufacturer is not liable for injuries 
caused by patent defects. [d. 
63. Micallef, 39 N.Y.2d at 383, 348 N.E.2d at 576, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 119 (citations 
omitted). 
64. [d. at 384-86, 348 N.E.2d at 576-77, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 120-21. 
65. [d. 
66. [d. at 385, 348 N.E.2d at 577, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 120-21. 
67. [d. 
68. See supra notes 57-67 and accompanying text. 
69. Cincotta v. United States, 362 F. Supp. 386, 406 (D. Md. 1973); Hooper v. Mougin, 
263 Md. 630, 635, 284 A.2d 236, 239 (1971); see also W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 486-92 (5th ed. 1984). 
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to incur, the risk?7° The standard applied to the patent-latent defense is 
more objective: Was there an obvious risk that a reasonable man would 
have avoided? When applying the patent defect defense or assumption of 
risk defense, the manufacturer is relieved of the burden of proving that 
the plaintiff subjectively appreciated the risk.7 1 
III. THE SOPHISTICATED USER DEFENSE 
Another defense asserted in products liability cases, similar to the 
patent defect defense and the assumption of risk defense, is the sophisti-
cated user defense. The sophisticated user defense is premised upon the 
theory that purchasers of a product, or professional users of a product, 
understand the potential risks associated with use of that product; there-
fore, the manufacturer has no duty to warn an employer-purchaser, or 
the employer's employees, of known dangers associated with the prod-
uct.72 The sophisticated user defense can be distinguished from the pat-
ent defect defense in that the risk or danger need not be "obvious." It is 
distinguishable from assumption of risk in that the manufacturer does 
not have the burden of proving that the plaintiff knew of, and voluntarily 
incurred, the risk. 
The seminal case in the area of the sophisticated user defense is Lit-
tlehale v. E. L DuPont de Nemours Co., 73 a products liability case based 
on negligence rather than strict liability. The United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York concluded in Littlehale that 
"[t]here need be no warning to one in a particular trade or profession 
against a danger generally known to that trade or profession,"74 and if 
there is no duty to warn the purchaser of the product, then there is no 
duty to warn an employee of the purchaser. 75 The Littlehale court based 
70. W. PROSSER & w. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 68, 
at 486-92 (5th ed. 1984). 
71. Micaliff v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 384, 348 N.E.2d 571, 576 (1976) (quoting 
Rheingold, Expanding Liability 0/ the Product Supplier: A Primer, 2 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 521, 541 (1974». 
72. See Strong v. E.!. DuPont de Nemours Co., 667 F.2d 682, 687 (8th Cir. 1981) (hold-
ing that where a user of a product knows of the danger, the manufacturer has no 
duty to warn); see also Prod. Liab. Newsletter, Nov. 1984, at I. 
73. 268 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). In an action based on a manufacturer's alleged 
negligent failure to warn of certain inherent dangers in the use of blasting caps, the 
court indicated that the manufacturer's duty to warn is irrelevant when the pur-
chaser is a sophisticated user. The plaintiff argued that DuPont failed to adequately 
warn of the dangers associated with the blasting caps it sold to the Navy, the plain-
tiff's employer. Id. at 798. Because the court was exercising its maritime jurisdic-
tion and no single state's law applied, the court applied general principles of 
products liability. Id. at 796-98. The court noted that the existence or adequacy of 
a warning is relevant only if there is a duty to warn and, in this case, there was no 
duty on the part of the manufacturer to warn the purchaser based upon the pur-
chaser's high level of expertise with regard to blasting caps. Id. 
74. Id. at 798 (citations omitted). 
75. Id. at 798-99 (citing Marker v. Universal Oil Prod. Co., 250 F.2d 603, 606 (10th Cir. 
1957». 
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its decision on a negligent failure to warn theory as found in the language 
of comment k to the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 388 (section 
388), which states that a manufacturer has no duty to warn if it has rea-
son to expect that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will discover 
its condition and realize the danger. 76 
The court noted that a manufacturer has a duty to warn a purchaser 
or a user of foreseeable and latent dangers, and this duty may exist even 
where there is no actual defect in the product.77 The court stressed, how-
ever, that "a manufacturer. . . is not absolutely liable as an insurer but 
is only required to exercise a reasonable degree of care commensurate 
with all the circumstances. "78 
As the court in Littlehale noted, other courts have concluded that if 
a manufacturer has no duty to warn a purchaser of its products based on 
that purchaser's sophisticated knowledge, there is no duty to warn an 
employee of the purchaser. 79 In Hopkins v. E. 1 DuPont de Nemours & 
Co. ,80 a case involving a manufacturer's alleged negligent failure to warn, 
the Third Circuit, applying Pennsylvania law, concluded that because the 
foreman had knowledge, or at least as much knowledge as the manufac-
turer, of the risk of premature detonation of dynamite placed in a newly 
drilled hole before allowing the heat generated by the drilling to subside, 
the manufacturer was not negligent in failing to warn of the danger. 81 
Therefore, the manufacturer was not liable for the resulting injuries to an 
employee who was working under the supervision of the foreman. 82 The 
court based its conclusion on the theory that the manufacturer could 
reasonably rely on the foreman to warn employees because of the fore-
man's sophisticated knowledge of the danger, and that in this situation 
the foreman's failure to warn was a superceding cause eliminating any 
duty or liability of the manufacturer. 83 
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has held that a manufacturer has the 
right to rely on a sophisticated purchaser to protect the purchaser's own 
76. Littlehale at 798-99. At the time of the decision, strict liability in tort, as embodied 
in the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A, had not yet been recognized by 
this court as a viable cause of action. Id. 
77. Id. at 798. 
78. Id. (citations omitted). 
79. Id. at 799-803; see infra notes 82-92 and accompanying text; see also Horak v. Pull-
man, Inc., 764 F.2d 1092, 1095-97 (5th Cir. 1985) (Even if the manufacturer of a 
railroad car had a duty to warn of the risk of injury from opening the car, the 
manufacturer could not be held liable for either strict liability failure to warn or 
negligent failure to warn under Texas law because the lack of warning was not the 
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. The plaintiff had actual knowledge of the 
risk involved.); Bradco Oil & Gas Co. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 532 F.2d 
501 (5th Cir. 1976) (sophisticated user defense applied in a strict liability duty to 
warn case), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1095 (1977). 
80. 212 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1954). 
81. Id. at 625-26. 
82.Id. 
83. See id. at 626-27. 
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employees from harm.84 In Marker v. Universal Oil Products CO.,85 an 
oil company employee was asphyxiated by carbon monoxide gas when he 
was lowered into a petroleum refining vessel constructed pursuant to the 
defendant's design. The plaintiff, in a wrongful death action, alleged that 
the decedent's death was caused by the defendant's failure to warn of 
dangers associated with recharging the vessel with a hot catalyst rather 
than a cold catalyst. 86 The court, interpreting the law of Oklahoma, de-
termined that the decedent's employer had as much knowledge of the 
risk as did the manufacturer; therefore, the manufacturer had no duty to 
warn.87 
The sophisticated user defense was also recognized by the Fifth Cir-
cuit in Bradco Oil & Gas Co. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. 88 In 
Bradco, the court, applying Louisiana law, held that a manufacturer has 
no duty to warn sophisticated purchasers of the dangers of which the 
purchaser knows or should be aware. 89 Bradco, based upon its own spec-
ifications, purchased high strength tubing from Youngstown for use in 
exploratory oil and gas drilling. During the drilling of a "producer" 
well, the tubing fractured due to the presence of hydrogen sulfide at the 
well site; as a result, Bradco was forced to abandon the well and suffered 
severe financial 10ss.90 
Bradco sued Youngstown claiming that Youngstown, the manufac-
turer, breached its duty to warn of the tubing's susceptibility to becoming 
brittle when used in wells containing even a trace of hydrogen sulfide. 
The court denied Bradco's claim explaining that "as an experienced oil 
and gas producer [Bradco was] chargeable with knowledge that even 
trace quantities of [hydrogen sulfide] could create a hazard."91 The court 
concluded that the proximate cause of the loss was Bradco's own selec-
tion of the improper tubing, not Youngstown's failure to warn.92 
A. Negligent Failure to Warn and Strict Liability Failure to Warn 
Failure to warn actions, like manufacturing and design defect ac-
84. Marker v. Universal Oil Prod. Co., 250 F.2d 603, 607 (10th Cir. 1957). 
85.Id. 
86. Id. at 604. 
87. Id. at 604-07; see also Thibodaux v. McWane Cast Iron Pipe Co., 381 F.2d 491,497 
(5th Cir. 1967). In Thibodaux, the plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer of cast 
iron pipe was negligent because it failed to warn the city which installed the pipe 
that the soil in the area could cause the pipe to corrode and result in a gas explosion. 
Thibodaux, 381 F.2d at 493-94. The court held that the manufacturer did not 
breach its duty to warn because the consulting engineers hired by the city "were or 
should have been as knowledgeable of the cast iron pipe as was [the manufacturer], 
perhaps more so." Id. at 497. 
88. 532 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1976). 
89. Id. at 503-04. An expert, appearing on behalf of defendant Youngstown, testified 
that the tubing selected by Bradco was susceptible to becoming brittle when exposed 
to hydrogen sulfide. Id. at 503. 
90.Id. 
91. Id. at 504. 
92.Id. 
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tions, usually include claims for both negligence and strict liability; how-
ever, courts disagree as to whether there is any significant difference 
between negligent and strict liability duty to warn.93 Some courts find 
that a manufacturer's duty to warn under section 402A is separate and 
distinct from its duty to warn under a negligence theory. Other courts, 
however, find that a manufacturer's duty to warn under either section 
402A or section 388 is substantially the same, and, therefore, should be 
analyzed only in terms of "reasonableness," a negligence principle.94 
Consequently, the availability of the sophisticated user defense depends 
upon whether a court analyzes a manufacturer's duty to warn under sec-
tion 402A or section 388. 
To determine whether any differences between the theories exist, it 
is necessary to compare sections 388 and 402A. The elements of a negli-
gent failure to warn action are set forth in section 388, which provides 
that a manufacturer is liable to one injured by its product when the 
manufacturer: 
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely 
to be dangerous for the use for which it was supplied, and (b) 
has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is 
supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and (c) fails to 
exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condi-
tion or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.95 
According to this theory, a plaintiff must prove that "the manufacturer 
knew or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known" of the po-
tential hazards.96 
In contrast, section 402A provides that a manufacturer is strictly 
liable for selling a product "in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property" regardless of whether 
the seller has "exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of 
his product."97 According to comment j of section 402A, "[i]n order to 
prevent the product from being unreasonably dangerous, the seller may 
be required to give directions or warning ... as to its use .... "98 
93. See infra notes 103-116 and accompanying text. 
94. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. 
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965). 
96. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 96, 
at 685 (5th ed. 1984). 
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). For the full text of section 
402A, see supra note 21. 
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965). 
Comment j states: 
Directions or Warning. In order to prevent the product from being 
unreasonably dangerous, the seller may be required to give directions or 
warning, on the container, as to its use. The seller may reasonably assume 
that those with common allergies ... will be aware of them, and he is not 
required to warn against them. Where, however, the product contains an 
ingredient to which a substantial number of the population are allergic, 
and the ingredient is one whose danger is not generally known, or if 
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Comment j also states, however, that the manufacturer has a duty to 
warn only "if he has knowledge, or by the application of reasonably de-
veloped human skill and foresight should have knowledge, ... [of] the 
danger."99 The language of this portion of comment j conflicts with the 
body of section 402A which states that strict liability applies regardless 
of whether "the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation 
and sale of his product."IOO Because the language of comment j uses the 
term "reasonably," which connotes principles of negligence, there is a 
question as to whether there is any real difference between a manufac-
turer's duty to warn under section 402A and section 388.101 Conse-
quently, there is disagreement as to whether foreseeability, a negligence 
principle, is an element in a strict liability duty to warn case.102 
Many courts and commentators have concluded that there is no 
meaningful distinction between a negligence action for failure to warn 
and a strict liability action for failure to warn.103 The New York 
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, in Rainbow v. Albert Elia Building 
Co. ,104 concluded that there is no significant difference between a section 
388 analysis and a section 402A analysis in failure to warn cases. lOS The 
court reasoned that "[u]nder either theory, the recovery ultimately de-
pends upon a subjective determination by the trier of the facts of what 
constitutes reasonable warning under all the circumstances."106 In Wer-
Id. 
known is one the consumer would reasonably not expect to find in the 
product, the seller is required to gIve warning against it, if he has knowl-
edge, or by the application of reasonably developed human skill and fore-
sight should have knowledge, or the presence of the ingredient and the 
danger. Likewise in the case of poisonous drugs, or those unduly danger-
ous for other reasons, warnings as to use may be required. 
99. Id. (emphasis added). 
100. Id. § 402A(2)(a). 
101. See Connelly, The Liability of a Manufacturer for Unknown Hazards Inherent in His 
Products, 32 INS. COUNS. J. 303, 307 (1965) (no rationale for imposing liability 
when risk is unknown); Kidwell, The Duty to Warn: A Description of the Model 
Decision, 53 TEX. L. REV. 1375, 1395 (1975) (manufacturers are not required to 
disclose risks that reasonably diligent inquiries fail to disclose; duty to warn only of 
foreseeable dangers); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consum-
ers), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 811 (1966) (when manufacturer knows or should know 
of danger, it is under a duty to warn); see also Merrill, Compensation for Prescription 
Drug Injuries, 59 VA. L. REV. 1, 30 (1973). 
102. See supra note 101 and accompanying text; infra notes 104-16 and accompanying 
text. 
103. See supra note 101 and accompanying text; infra notes 104-16 and accompanying 
text. 
104. 49 A.D.2d 250, 373 N.Y.S.2d 928 (1975). 
105. Id. at 253, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 930-31. 
106. !d. Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has stated that under either section 402A or sec-
tion 388, the key issue is whether there has been a breach of the duty to give proper 
warning; how this breach is characterized or classified is unimportant to the case. 
Sterling Drug v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978,992 (8th Cir. 1969). The Eighth Circuit has 
also indicated that there is no duty to warn under section 388 if the user knows or 
should know of the potential danger, especially when the user is a professional who 
should be aware of the characteristics of the product. The court recognized that 
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ner v. Upjohn Co., 107 the Fourth Circuit concluded that any distinction 
between the two theories is too small to produce a different result in any 
case.108 The court acknowledged that one distinguishing characteristic 
between the two theories is that in a negligence case, the plaintiff must 
show a breach of duty by the manufacturer to use due care; in a strict 
liability action, the plaintiff must show that the product was unreasona-
bly dangerous. 109 The court explained, however, that this distinction les-
sens considerably in failure to warn cases because "it is clear that [a] 
strict liability [theory] adds little" to a negligent failure to warn case. 110 
The court concluded that the issue is essentially the same in either a 
negligent failure to warn action or a strict liability failure to warn action: 
Whether the warning was adequate?lll 
Contrary to this position, other jurisdictions and scholars emphasize 
an important distinction between negligent failure to warn and strict lia-
bility failure to warn actions. Professors Keeton and Wade argue that a 
manufacturer's lack of awareness of the dangerousness of its product is 
totally irrelevant in a strict liability action.112 Based upon the language 
of section 402A, Professor Keeton argues that a manufacturer is liable 
even if it used all possible care in the preparation and sale of its prod-
uct.l\3 Some jurisdictions have adopted the view of Keeton and Wade 
holding that knowledge of a product's defective condition is imputed to 
the manufacturer in a strict liability claim.114 The Supreme Court of 
New Jersey held that, in a strict liability action, the plaintiff need not 
prove that the manufacturer knew or should have known of the risks 
associated with the use of its product; such knowledge is imputed to the 
this limitation on the duty to warn is substantially similar to that under strict liabil-
ity because section 402A states that "a manufacturer has no duty to warn when the 
dangers of a product are within the professional knowledge of the user." Strong v. 
E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 667 F.2d 682, 687 (8th Cir. 1981). 
107. 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980). In Werner, the Fourth Circuit, interpreting Maryland 
law, concluded that rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence precludes the admis-
sion of evidence of subsequent precautionary measures to prove negligence; there-
fore, such evidence should not be admitted to prove strict liability because the two 
theories are substantially the same. Id. at 857-58. 
108. /d. 
109. Id. at 858. 
110. Id. 
111. Id.; see also Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377, 380-81 (D. Md. 
1975), aff'd, 567 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1977). In Chambers, the plaintiff sought dam-
ages for injuries allegedly caused by a drug manufactured by the defendant. Cham-
bers, 441 F. Supp. at 379. Discussing the viability of the plaintiff's strict liability 
claim, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland noted that "a 
theory of strict liability is essentially the same as a theory of negligence in so far as 
the question of furnishings is concerned .... " Id. at 380. 
112. Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEX. L. REV. 398, 407-
08 (1969); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 
825, 834-35 (1973). 
113. Keeton, supra note 112, at 407-09. 
114. See infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text. 
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manufacturer. 115 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has noted a distinction be-
tween the two theories in that strict liability is product oriented and neg-
ligence is based on the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct: 
In strict liability it is of no moment what defendant "had rea-
son to believe." Liability arises from "sell[ing] any product in a 
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or con-
sumer." It is the unreasonableness of the condition of the prod-
uct, not of the conduct of the defendant, that creates 
liability. 116 
B. Section 402A or Section 388 - Effect on the Sophisticated 
User Defense 
A court's decision that there is, or is not, a significant distinction 
between section 402A and section 388 in a products liability case based 
on a manufacturer's failure to warn has a great impact on whether a 
manufacturer will be able to assert the sophisticated user defense. Courts 
focusing on the reasonableness of a manufacturer's conduct in warning 
users of possible dangers associated with the use of its product hold that 
there is no distinction between the two duty to warn theories. ll7 These 
courts apply a section 388 negligence analysis, which is conduct-ori-
ented. 1l8 Consequently, these courts more willingly recognize the so-
phisticated user defense. 119 This point is demonstrated in Strong v. E. l 
DuPont de Nemours Co., 120 where the Eighth Circuit, applying a section 
388 analysis, held that there is no duty to warn under Nebraska law if the 
user knows or should know of the potential danger, especially when the 
user is a professional who should be aware of the product's characteris-
tics. l2l In Strong, a construction supervisor for Nebraska Natural Gas 
Co. was investigating a reported gas leak in a hotel. Cold weather caused 
a two-inch section of pipe and a connecting device to shrink, resulting in 
the leak and ultimately in an explosion at the hotel causing the fatal inju-
115. Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229,432 A.2d 925 (1981). The court, 
citing Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 498, 525 P.2d 1033, 1039 
(1974), noted that under a strict liability theory, the seller's knowledge of the prod-
uct's defect is presumed, whereas in negligence cases, such knowledge must be 
proved based on the standard of what the manufacturer knew or should have 
known. Freund, 87 N.J. at 239, 432 A.2d at 929-30. 
116. Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809, 812 (9th Cir. 1974) (correction 
in original) (action by a painter against the manufacturer of certain paint products 
based on the manufacturer's failure to warn); cf Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. 
Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982) (the court rejected the state of the art 
defense in strict liability failure to warn cases). 
117. See infra notes 120-31 and accompanying text. 
118. See infra notes 120-31 and accompanying text. 
119. See infra notes 120-31 and accompanying text. 
120. 667 F.2d 682 (8th Cir. 1981). 
121. Id. at 687; see also Martinez v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 529 F.2d 457, 464-65 (5th Cir. 
1976). 
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ries of the supervisor. 122 The court, relying on subsection b of section 
388, granted one defendant's motion for a directed verdict holding that 
there was no duty to warn because both the decedent and his employer 
knew, or should have known, of the dangers. 123 The court noted that 
even if a manufacturer is under a duty to warn, its failure to do so would 
not be the proximate cause of an injury if the user and his employer were 
aware of the danger and could have avoided the danger themselves. 124 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, interpreting the law of Montana, held 
in Jacobson v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. 125 that a manufacturer does 
not have a duty to warn when the purchaser of the product and his su-
pervising personnel have knowledge that use of the product is potentially 
harmful. 126 In Jacobson, an employee was killed when a steel strand 
manufactured by the defendant snapped while being used by the em-
ployer.127 After analyzing the language of both section 402A and section 
388,128 and reviewing case law, 129 the court held "the manufacturer had 
no duty to warn the purchaser of danger already known by the purchaser 
and its supervising personnel." 130 The court noted that if there is a duty 
to warn, it is the duty of the employer, not the manufacturer, to warn its 
employees of dangers of which it had knowledge. l3l 
Other courts, however, distinguish between the section 388 negli-
gence approach and the section 402A strict liability approach in duty to 
warn cases.132 These courts view the section 402A strict liability ap-
122. Strong, 667 F.2d at 683-84. 
123. [d. at 687. 
124. [d. at 688; see also Hammond v. Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 204 Neb. 80, 86, 281 
N.W.2d 520, 524 (1979) (the court noted that where the danger is known through-
out the industry, the user's duty to the public is nondelegable and the user cannot 
rely on the manufacturer to warn the public). 
125. 409 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1969). But cf Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 
F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974) (five years later, the Ninth Circuit rejected the sophisti-
cated user defense under the law of Montana). 
126. 409 F.2d at 1272-73. 
127. [d. at 1264-65. The steel strand was being used by the employer in a concrete press-
ing operation as both horizontal reinforcement tendons, the manufacturer's in-
tended use, and as vertical hold-down cables, a use designed by the employer's 
technicians. [d. The technicians and the employer knew that the unintended use 
was potentially dangerous. Id. at 1265. 
128. Id. at 1270-71. The court discussed both section 402A and section 388. [d. It is 
unclear, however, as to which theory it relied upon when making its ultimate deci-
sion. The court indicated that it would reach the same conclusion under either 
section 402A or section 388, finding no difference between a manufacturer's duty to 
warn under either section 402A or section 388. See id. at 1273. 
129. See Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968) (a manufac-
turer is under a duty to warn of dangers in potentially dangerous products); Hop-
kins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 212 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1954) (applying 
section 388, the court held that a manufacturer does not have a duty to warn where 
it reasonably believes the users of the chattel knew or should have known of any 
potential dangers). 
130. Jacobson, 409 F.2d at 1273. 
131. [d. at 1272. 
132. See Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229,432 A.2d 925 (1981); Marti-
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proach as "product-oriented."133 Thus, they focus on the potential dan-
gers associated with the use of the product when sold without adequate 
warning, not on the "reasonableness" of the manufacturer's actions. 134 
Under this approach, it is the reasonableness of the product's condition, 
not the conduct of the manufacturer, that creates liability. \35 The confu-
sion as to whether a section 388 negligence analysis or a section 402A 
strict liability analysis applies in a strict liability failure to warn action is 
facilitated by the unavoidable use of the negligence term "reasonable-
ness" under either theory. 136 
The section 402A strict liability theory places a greater duty on a 
manufacturer to warn of potential dangers associated with the use of a 
product than does the section 388 negligence theory.137 The manufac-
turer's duty to warn under a section 402A strict liability theory extends 
to the "ultimate user" of the product, and the adequacy of the warning is 
measured according to the common knowledge and understanding of the 
ordinary user or consumer; the superior knowledge of the user's em-
ployer or supervisors is irrelevant. 138 It is for this reason that courts 
applying a section 402A analysis to duty to warn cases generally reject 
the sophisticated user defense. 
Despite having recognized the sophisticated user defense five years 
earlier in Jacobson v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp., \39 the Ninth Circuit, 
again applying Montana law, rejected the sophisticated user defense in 
Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer CO.14O The court distinguished Jacob-
son on its facts. The product in Jacobson was bulk steel, and any warning 
placed on the product could not reasonably be expected to reach the ulti-
nez v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 529 F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1976); Jackson v. Coast Paint & 
Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974); Hamilton v. Hardy, 37 Colo. App. 375, 
549 P.2d 1099 (1976); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 
(1974); Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975). 
133. Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 238, 432 A.2d 925, 929 (1981); 
Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485,498, 525 P.2d 1033, 1039 (1974). 
134. Freund at 238, 432 A.2d at 929; Phillips at 498, 525 P.2d at 1039. 
135. See infra notes 140-47 and accompanying text. 
136. See Wade supra note 112, at 832-33 (Professor Wade notes that use of the term 
"unreasonably dangerous" in strict liability gives rise to connotations of negligence). 
137. Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809, 812 (9th Cir. 1974) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comments j & i (1965)). 
138. Jackson, 499 F.2d at 812-13. With regard to a manufacturer's duty to warn, the 
issue is "whether the danger, or potentiality of danger, is generally known and rec-
ognized; whether the product as sold was 'dangerous to an extent beyond that which 
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordi-
nary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.''' [d. at 812 
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A commentsj & i (1965)) (empha-
sis in original). 
139. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text. 
140. 499 F.2d 809, 812-13 (9th Cir. 1974). The plaintiff was burned severely during a fire 
that occurred while he was using paint manufactured by one of the defendants. The 
label on the paint warned against the inhalation of toxic vapors; however, the label 
failed to warn the user of the possibility of fire when the paint was used in improp-
erly ventilated areas. [d. at 810-11. 
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mate user.141 The product in Jackson, however, was packaged paint, and 
it would be reasonable to expect a warning on the packaged product to 
reach the ultimate user.142 The court noted that section 402A failure to 
warn and section 388 failure to warn constitute two separate and distinct 
theories of liability. 143 The court held that the issue in a strict liability 
failure to warn action is whether the product, without an adequate warn-
ing, is potentially dangerous to the ordinary consumer with ordinary 
knowledge common to the community.l44 The actual knowledge of the 
plaintiff is irrelevant. 145 The court further concluded that the manufac-
turer's duty was to the ultimate user; therefore, "the adequacy of the 
warnings [on the paint] must be measured according to whatever knowl-
edge is common to painters who will actually open the containers and 
use the paints," not by the possible superior knowledge of the painter's 
employer or contractor. 146 
Distinguishing between section 388 negligent failure to warn and 
section 402A strict liability failure to warn, the Ninth Circuit empha-
sized that a manufacturer should be held strictly liable where the product 
sold is dangerous to an extent beyond that contemplated by the ordinary 
consumer who purchases that product. 147 The court indicated that a 
manufacturer's duty to warn under section 402A extends to the ultimate 
user, irrespective of the sophisticated knowledge of the user's employer. 
The courts' struggle in deciding whether to distinguish between sec-
tion 388 negligent failure to warn and section 402A strict liability failure 
to warn is another example of the continuing battle to balance conflicting 
interests involved in products liability cases: the consumers' desire to be 
compensated for injuries caused by dangerous products, and the manu-
facturers' interest in producing items that are beneficial to the public. 
Courts that conclude that there is no significant distinction between sec-
tion 388 negligent failure to warn and section 402A strict liability failure 
to warn base their conclusion on the theory that any duty to warn on the 
part of a manufacturer depends upon the reasonableness of the manufac-
turer's actions in marketing the product without an adequate warning. 
Consequently, these courts tip the scale in favor of the manufacturers' 
interest in manufacturing products that are beneficial to the public. 
Courts that distinguish between section 388 negligent failure to warn and 
section 402A strict liability failure to warn, however, tilt the scale in 
favor of the consumers' interest in being compensated for injuries caused 
141. See supra notes 125-31 and accompanying text. 
142. Jackson,499 F.2d at 813-14. 
143. Id. at 812-13. 
144. Id. at 812. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 812-13. 
147. Id. at 812; see also Martinez v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 529 F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1976) 
(the plaintiff, injured while stripping paint from a barge, claimed that the manufac-
turer of the chemical product was liable for failing to warn of the product's inherent 
dangers); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1965). 
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by products distributed in the market-place. Once a court determines 
whether to apply a section 402A analysis or a section 388 analysis in duty 
to warn cases, a manufacturer will know whether the sophisticated user 
defense is available. If the court recognizes a distinction between section 
402A strict liability duty to warn and section 388 negligent duty to warn, 
the sophisticated user defense should be unavailable to a manufacturer; 
however, if the court recognizes no distinction and analyzes a manufac-
turer's duty to warn solely in terms of negligence concepts, the sophisti-
cated user defense should be available to the manufacturer. 148 
Unfortunately, this may not always be the case. In two recent decisions, 
the Fourth Circuit, applying the law of Virginia, failed to recognize the 
sophisticated user defense in one case but accepted the defense in a sec-
ond case, notwithstanding that each was analyzed under the same the-
ory: section 388 negligent failure to warn. 149 
The sophisticated user defense was rejected by the Fourth Circuit in 
Oman v. Johns-Manville Corp., 150 an action by shipyard workers against 
asbestos manufacturers for injuries allegedly caused by the asbestos man-
ufacturers' failure to warn of the dangers associated with exposure to 
asbestos products. 151 The court focused on whether the manufacturers' 
duty to warn was discharged because the purchaser of the product, who 
was also the employer of the injured employees, had sophisticated knowl-
edge of the dangers associated with the use of the product. 152 The court 
analyzed the case under section 388 negligent failure to warn concepts l53 
because the doctrine of strict liability in tort, as set forth in section 402A, 
had not been adopted in Virginia. 154 In addition, Virginia law specifi-
cally includes comment n of section 388,155 which discusses various fac-
tors used in determining the reasonableness of the manufacturer's actions 
in informing a third person of dangers associated with the product. 156 
The court noted that these factors include: 
(1) the dangerous condition of the product; (2) the purpose for 
148. See supra notes 93-116 and accompanying text. 
149. Compare Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1985) (upholding the use of the 
sophisticated user defense) with Oman v. Johns-Manville Corp., 764 F.2d 224 (4th 
Cir. 1985) (rejecting the use of the sophisticated user defense). 
150. 764 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1984). 
151. /d. at 232-33. The court first ruled that the cause of action did not come within the 
purview of admiralty jurisdiction. Id. at 226-32. 
152. /d. at 232-33. The defendants alleged that the district court erred in charging the 
jury as to a manufacturer's duty to warn. Id. 
153. Id. Section 388 was adopted by the Supreme Court of Virginia in Featherall v. 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 219 Va. 949, 962, 252 S.E.2d 358, 366 (1979). 
154. See Goodbar v. Whitehead Bros., 591 F. Supp. 552, 555 (W.D. Va. 1984) (citing 
Matthews v. Ford Motor Co., 479 F.2d 399, 401 n.2 (4th Cir. 1973», aff'd sub nom. 
Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1985); Brockett v. Harrell Bros., Inc., 206 
Va. 457, 462-63, 143 S.E.2d 897, 902 (1965). 
155. Oman, 764 F.2d at 233 (citing Jones v. Meat Packers Equip. Co., 723 F.2d 370, 373 
(4th Cir. 1983»; Barnes v. Litton Indus. Prod., Inc., 555 F.2d 1184, 1188 (4th Cir. 
1977); Goodbar, 591 F. Supp. at 557. 
156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 comment n (1965). 
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which the product is used; (3) the form of any warnings given; 
(4) the reliability of the third party as a conduit of necessary 
information about the product; (5) the magnitude of the risk 
involved; and (6) the burdens imposed upon the supplier by re-
quiring that he directly warn all users. 157 
Analyzing these factors, the court determined that the district court did 
not err in refusing to instruct the jury that a manufacturer's duty to warn 
the ultimate user is satisfied if the user's employer has sophisticated 
knowledge of the dangers. A product containing asbestos fibers is very 
dangerous, and there is only a slight burden on the manufacturers to 
place adequate warnings on their products, which could reasonably be 
calculated to reach the ultimate users. 158 
Two months later, the Fourth Circuit decided Beale v. Hardy,159 a 
suit by employees of the Lynchburg Foundry against manufacturers who 
supplied the foundry with silica sand and related products. 16O The 
Lynchburg Foundry, a large manufacturer of metal castings, used "enor-
mous" quantities of silica sand in its molding process. 161 The sand was 
delivered to the foundry unpackaged in railroad cars. 162 During the 
manufacturing process, the silica was broken into tiny particles, which 
entered the employees' lungs and caused the formation of scar tissue. 163 
The employees claimed the manufacturers were liable for the result-
ing injuries because they failed to warn the employees of the dangers 
associated with silica and of methods the employees could have imple-
mented to protect themselves from these dangers. l64 In response, the 
manufacturers asserted the sophisticated user defense by contending that 
the foundry had knowledge of the dangers associated with exposure to 
silica since the 1930's and that only the foundry could communicate an 
effective warning to its employees. 165 The injured employees answered 
that the manufacturers' duty to warn of an allegedly latent danger was a 
nondelegable duty. 166 
The District Court for the Western District of Virginia applied a 
section 388 analysis of a manufacturer's duty to warn and determined 
that the availability of the sophisticated user defense depended upon 
whether the manufacturers had acted unreasonably by relying upon the 
foundry to warn its employees of the dangers associated with silica. 167 
157. Oman, 764 F.2d at 233. 
158. [d. 
159. 769 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1985). 
160. [d. at 213. 
161. Goodbar v. Whitehead Bros., 591 F. Supp. 552, 554 (W.D. Va. 1984), aff'd sub 
nom. Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1985). 
162. [d. at 554-55. 
163. /d. at 555. This disease is known as "silicosis." [d. 
164. [d. at 555. 
165. [d. at 556. 
166. [d. 
167. [d. at 557. Under section 388, a manufacturer is liable for failure to warn when it 
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The district court examined the factors set forth in comment n of section 
388 just as the Fourth Circuit did in Oman. 168 The district court found 
that (1) Lynchburg Foundry was a sophisticated user of silica products 
and that it had extensive knowledge regarding the dangers associated 
with inhaling silica dust,169 (2) the duty to warn may be a nondelegable 
duty under a strict liability theory, but under negligence standards, such 
a proposition is not true,170 and (3) the manufacturers had every reason 
to expect that the foundry, a sophisticated purchaser, would recognize 
the dangers and communicate any necessary warnings to its employ-
ees. 171 The district court concluded that in negligent failure to warn 
cases, a manufacturer's duty to warn of the dangers associated with the 
use of its product, does not extend to the employees of sophisticated pur-
chasers because it would be reasonable for the manufacturers to rely 
upon the sophisticated purchaser to give an appropriate warning to its 
employees. 172 
The Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's recognition of the so-
phisticated user defense. 173 The Fourth Circuit determined that the dis-
trict court had correctly analyzed the case under section 388,174 and, 
therefore, because the foundry had sophisticated knowledge of the 
hazards associated with silica dust and proper dust control techniques, 
the manufacturers of the silica products had no duty to warn. 175 
Beale and Oman indicate that although a court applies a section 388 
negligence analysis to a duty to warn claim, the sophisticated user de-
fense still may not be available to manufacturers. The availability of the 
defense seems to hinge upon the facts of each case and upon an analysis 
of those facts in terms of the factors set forth in comment n of section 
388. In Oman, the Fourth Circuit and the district court rejected the 
defense for three reasons: (1) the product, asbestos, was very dangerous; 
(2) there was only a slight burden on the manufacturers to put warnings 
on their products; and (3) such warnings reasonably could have been 
calculated to reach the employees, because the employees usually han-
"(a) supplies a defective or dangerous product; (b) has no reason to believe that the 
user ... lacks knowledge of this defect or dangerous condition; and (c) cannot 
reasonably rely upon the purchaser/employer ... to supply necessary warnings to 
... the ultimate users of the product." Goodbar, 591 F. Supp. at 556. 
168. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
169. Goodbar, 591 F. Supp. at 558, 561-65. 
170. [d. at 558. The court distinguished the case from Neal v. Carey Can. Mines, Ltd., 
548 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1982), in that Neal was brought under both theories of 
negligence and strict liability, and the case at hand was brought only under negli-
gence. [d. 
171. Goodbar, 591 F. Supp.at 558, 560-61. 
172. [d. at 557, 559-60 (citing Marker v. Universal Oil Prod. Co., 250 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 
1957); see Littlehale v. E.1. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 268 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y. 
1966), aff'd, 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967). 
173. Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214-15 (4th Cir. 1985). 
174. [d. at 214. 
175. [d. at 214-15. 
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dIed the products in the original packaging. 176 In Beale, although the 
silica products were dangerous, the silica sand never reached the employ-
ees in its packaged form; the sand was delivered to the employees in rail-
road cars. The court stated that the method used to deliver the sand 
made it burdensome for manufacturers to put warnings on the sand. 
Moreover, any such warning reasonably could not be calculated to reach 
the users because the product was not delivered in its original package. 177 
Thus, the Beale court determined that it was reasonable for the manufac-
turers to rely upon the employer/purchaser to warn its own employees of 
the dangers associated with exposure to silica. 178 
Although the Fourth Circuit applied a section 388 negligent failure 
to warn analysis in both Oman and Beale, the factual differences in the 
two cases led to differing results as to whether the sophisticated user de-
fense was available. Thus, where a product is likely to reach the ultimate 
user in unpackaged form, the defense is available because any warning 
put on the product by the manufacturer could not be expected to reach 
the ultimate user. The defense is unavailable, however, where (1) the 
product is very dangerous, (2) there is only a slight burden on manufac-
turers to place warnings on the product, and (3) the warning is likely to 
reach the ultimate user. 
C. The Sophisticated User Defense in Asbestos Products Liability Cases 
As evidenced by Oman v. Johns-Manville Corp. ,179 the sophisticated 
user defense recently has become an important issue in products liability 
cases involving the scope of an asbestos manufacturer's duty to warn in-
sulation workers of the dangers associated with the use of asbestos insu-
lation materials. ISO Traditionally, the asbestos manufacturers have relied 
primarily on four defenses: (1) general denial; (2) contributory negli-
gence; (3) assumption of risk; and in certain jurisdictions, (4) the state of 
the art defense. lSI In asbestos cases, as in most other products liability 
cases, a court's Willingness to recognize the sophisticated user defense is 
dependent upon whether that court applies a section 388 negligence anal-
ysis or a section 402A strict liability analysis of a manufacturer's duty to 
warn. 182 
The Fifth Circuit refused to recognize the sophisticated user defense 
in a strict liability suit against an asbestos manufacturer in Borel v. 
176. See Oman v. Johns-Manville Corp., 764 F.2d 224, 232-33 (4th Cir. 1985). 
177. See Goodbar v. Whitehead Bros., 591 F. Supp. 552,559 n.7 (W.D. Va. 1984), aff'd 
sub nom. Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1985). 
178. See id. at 554-55, 557. . 
179. 764 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1985); see also supra notes 150-58 and accompanying text. 
180. See supra notes 150-58 and accompanying text. 
181. See supra notes 39·71 and accompanying text. 
182. See supra notes 103-11 and accompanying text. Courts that apply a section 388 
negligence analysis in strict liability failure to warn cases hold that the duty of a 
manufacturer to warn is substantially the same under either section 388 or section 
402A. Id. 
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Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. 183 The manufacturer appealed the trial 
court's decision to refuse to instruct the jury that a "product cannot be 
unreasonably dangerous l84 if it conforms to the expectations of the in-
dustrial purchasers, here, the [asbestos] insulation contractors."185 The 
manufacturer argued that the insulation contractors, who were the plain-
tiff's employers, were sophisticated users of the product and as such had 
a duty to warn the plaintiff of the potential risks in working with asbestos 
products. 186 The court, applying Texas law, rejected this contention 
based upon section 402A and held that a manufacturer is liable to the 
"ultimate consumer or user" for failure to give adequate warnings. 187 
The court held that the presence of an intermediary, such as an em-
ployer, does not relieve a manufacturer of its duty to warn the employees 
who are the ultimate users of the asbestos products. 188 
The reasoning behind the Fifth Circuit's decision in Borel is that 
under a strict liability duty to warn theory, the knowledge of the em-
ployer is irrelevant because the duty to warn extends to the ultimate 
users of the product.189 Under section 402A, a product is unreasonably 
dangerous if it is marketed without an adequate warning that could have 
prevented an injury to the ultimate users; therefore, the manufacturer is 
held strictly liable. 190 The United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania held that the manufacturer has a "nondelegable 
duty" to provide adequate warnings to the ultimate users.191 Thus, in 
duty to warn cases against asbestos manufacturers analyzed under sec-
tion 402A, the manufacturer's duty to warn extends to the asbestos insu-
lation workers, who are the ultimate users of the asbestos products. 192 
183. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). An insulation 
worker brought suit against various asbestos insulation manufacturers for negligent 
failure to warn and strict liability failure to warn that exposure to asbestos could 
cause cancer. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff on 
the basis of the strict liability claim. Id. at 1081. 
184. Id. The court noted that "for a product to be unreasonably dangerous, 'it must be 
so dangerous that a reasonable man would not sell the product if he knew the risk 
involved.'" Id. at 1088 (citing Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 
850 (5th Cir. 1967)). 
185. !d. at 1091. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. at 1087-88, 1091. 
188. Id. at 1091. But cf supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text (the Ninth Circuit, 
in Jacobson v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp., 409 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1969), noted 
that it is the duty of the sophisticated employer, not the manufacturer, to warn its 
employees). 
189. Borel, 443 F.2d at 1091; see also Neal v. Carey Can. Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 
368 (E.D. Pa. 1982), a./J'd sub nom. Van Buskirk v. Carey Can. Mines, Ltd., 760 
F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1985). 
190. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965). 
191. Neal, 548 F. Supp. at 368. The court concluded that the manufacturers and suppli-
ers of asbestos insulation products had a duty to warn the employees, the ultimate 
users of the asbestos products. of the possibility of contracting cancer after exposure 
to asbestos. Id. 
192. Id.; see also Hammond v. North Am. Asbestos Corp., 97 Ill. 2d 195, 454 N.E.2d 
210 (1983); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973). 
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In Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp.,193 the defendant 
asbestos manufacturers claimed that they had no duty to warn the plain-
tiff asbestos insulation workers. The manufacturers argued that although 
the plaintiffs were the ultimate users, the plaintiffs' employers were "so-
phisticated purchasers" with as much or more knowledge of the dangers 
associated with asbestos than the defendants. 194 The manufacturers fur-
ther argued that they were entitled to rely on the employer/purchaser to 
give the necessary warnings to its employees. 195 The Hammond court 
rejected the sophisticated user defense for primarily four reasons: (1) the 
manufacturers knew of the dangerous propensities of asbestos but chose 
not to warn of the risks; 196 (2) in a section 402A strict liability action, the 
asbestos manufacturers are liable not only to those in privity with them, 
but also to the ultimate user;197 (3) the sellers and manufacturers have a 
nondelegable duty to produce a safe product and to warn of any potential 
dangers; 198 and (4) based on the facts and circumstances of the case, the 
asbestos manufacturers should not rely on others to intervene and make 
the product safe by warning of any inherent dangers. 199 
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia accepted the sophisticated user defense in an asbestos products 
liability action in In re Related Asbestos Cases.2oo In that case, the de-
fendant asbestos manufacturers asserted that the United States Navy, the 
employer of the injured plaintiff, was aware of the dangers of asbestos. 
The manufacturers further claimed that the Navy's failure to warn its 
employees absolved the manufacturers from liability for failure to 
warn. 201 After noting that the sophisticated user defense had been ac-
cepted in strict liability actions in various federal courts applying state 
law under diversity jurisdiction,202 the district court noted that the so-
phisticated user defense is similar to the affirmative defense that the em-
ployer's failure to warn was a superceding cause and the proximate cause 
of the plaintiff's injuries.203 The court determined that the sophisticated 
193. 97 Ill. 2d 195, 454 N.E.2d 210 (1983). The plaintiff was the wife of an asbestos 
insulation worker who suffered from "asbestosis," a cancer-related illness associated 
with exposure to asbestos. The plaintiff brought an action against numerous asbes-
tos manufacturers for loss of consortium. Id. at 198-99, 454 N.E.2d at 213. 
194. Id. at 208, 454 N.E.2d at 217 (the plaintiff's employers were insulation contractors). 
195. Id. 
196. Id. In this case it was not that the manufacturers provided inadequate warnings; 
rather, it was that the manufacturers failed to provide any warnings at all. Id. 
197. Id. 
198.Id. 
199. Id. at 208, 454 N.E.2d at 218. 
200. 543 F. Supp. 1142 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (applying California law). 
201. Id. at 1150. 
202. Id. at 1151 (citing Bradco Oil & Gas Co. v. Youngstown Steel & Tube Co., 532 F.2d 
501 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1095 (1976); Littlehale v. E.!. DuPont de 
Nemours Co., 298 F. Supp. 791 (S.D. N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 
1967); Marker v. Universal Oil Prod. Co., 250 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1957)). 
203. In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. at 1150-51. The court stated that under 
the defense of superceding cause, the defendant manufacturer still would need to 
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user defense is a viable affirmative defense in a strict liability duty to 
warn action under California law.204 
It is apparent that in products liability cases the sophisticated user 
defense will be allowed in most negligent failure to warn cases,20S but the 
validity of the defense is not as well established in strict liability claims 
for failure to warn.206 Focusing on the differences between a negligent 
failure to warn theory207 and a strict liability failure to warn theory,20S 
some courts have concluded that in a strict liability action the manufac-
turer's duty to warn cannot depend upon the buyer's or user's knowl-
edge. 209 Moreover, the sophistication of a purchaser, employer, or 
ultimate user does not obviate a manufacturer's duty to warn under sec-
tion 402A; such a duty is nondelegable.210 
Thus, in a strict liability action, the sophisticated user defense more 
likely will be recognized in a jurisdiction that views a manufacturer's 
duty to warn under section 402A as substantially similar to section 388. 
In these jurisdictions, a manufacturer is under a duty only to act reason-
ably,21I and if it is reasonable for a manufacturer to expect the ultimate 
prove that the actions of the user or an intermediary (e.g., an employer) were a 
superceding and proximate cause of the injuries. Id. 
204. Id. at 1151. The district court relied on the dictum in Fierro v. International Har-
vester Co., 127 Cal. App. 3d 862, 179 Cal. Rptr. 923 (1982), where the California 
court noted that the manufacturer of a truck had no duty to warn of the hazards of 
the truck's fuel tank design because the features and dangers were known or readily 
observable by the employer of the deceased. Fierro, 127 Cal. App. 3d at 866, 179 
Cal. Rptr. at 925. 
205. See Menna v. Johns-ManviIle Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1178, 1185 (D. N.J. 1984). The 
court concluded that the sophisticated user defense could not be precluded as a 
matter of law in a negligence action because, based on the language of section 388, 
the issue in a negligence action is whether the manufacturer acted reasonably in 
relying upon the user's knowledge or upon the employer to warn his own employ-
ees. Id. The court did, however, preclude use of the defense as to the strict liability 
failure to warn claim. See infra note 206 and accompanying text; see also White-
head v. St. Joe Lead Co., 729 F.2d 238, 252-54 (3d Cir. 1984) (the court noted that 
under New Jersey law the sophisticated knowledge of the defendant is relevant in 
negligent failure to warn cases but not in strict liability failure to warn cases). 
206. See Menna v. Johns-Manville Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (D. N.J. 1984); see also 
supra notes 133-46 and accompanying text. 
207. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388; see also supra notes 133-46 and ac-
companying text. 
208. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A; see also supra notes 133-46 and 
accompanying text. 
209. See supra notes 117-31, 150-78 and accompanying text; see also Menna, 585 F. 
Supp. at 1184. In rejecting the sophisticated user defense as to the plaintiff's strict 
liability claim, the court stated that under strict liability, a manufacturer that pro-
duces defective products is liable even if those products are carefully produced. Id. 
Moreover, liability extends not just to the initial purchaser, but to all foreseeable 
users. It follows that the duty to warn under section 402A cannot depend on a 
particular buyer's knowledge or level of sophistication. !d.; see also supra notes 130-
44 and accompanying text (discussion regarding courts that have rejected the so-
phisticated user defense in nonasbestos cases). 
210. Id. at 1184-85. 
211. See supra notes 117-32 and accompanying text. 
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user, or the user's employer, to know of the potential dangers, the manu-
facturer will not be held liable despite its failure to adequately warn of 
the potential dangers. 212 Under a strict liability theory, however, the 
manufacturer's duty to warn extends to the ultimate user, and the rea-
sonableness of the manufacturer's conduct is irrelevant.213 Therefore, if 
the ultimate user is injured by a product due to the manufacturer's fail-
ure to provide an adequate warning, or any warning at all, the manufac-
turer is strictly liable.214 
D. The Validity of the Sophisticated User Defense in Maryland 
A manufacturer has a duty to warn under Maryland law if the man-
ufacturer's product has "an inherent and hidden danger about which the 
producer knows, or should know, could be a substantial factor in bring-
ing injury to an individual or his property .... "2IS In Moran v. 
Faberge,216 a minor and her father217 brought a products liability action 
against a cologne manufacturer for injuries sustained when the minor's 
friend poured cologne on a burning candle causing the cologne to ignite 
and injure the minor.218 The plaintiffs based their products liability suit 
upon the theory that Faberge was negligent by failing to warn of the 
cologne's latent flammability characteristic.219 
The court emphasized that a manufacturer's duty to produce a safe 
product, with adequate warnings when necessary, is substantially the 
same duty that requires individuals to exercise due care in order to avoid 
unreasonable risk of injury to others.22o In determining what constitutes 
an unreasonable risk, the court indicated that the probability and serious-
ness of the potential harm must be weighed against the costs necessary to 
avoid the risk of harm.221 The court noted, however, that in negligent 
failure to warn cases, the cost of providing an adequate warning is usu-
ally comparatively minimal and that the scale will "almost always" 
weigh in favor of requiring the manufacturer to provide an adequate 
212. Id. 
213. See supra notes 133-46 and accompanying text. 
214.Id. 
215. Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 552, 332 A.2d 11, 20 (1975). 
216. Id. 
217. The plaintiff, Nancy Moran, was a minor at the time the action was initiated. Suit 
was brought on her behalf by her father, Elbert M. Moran. Id. at 539 n.l, 332 A.2d 
at 12 n.l. Elbert M. Moran was also a plaintiff on his own behalf to recover for 
medical expenses he incurred for treatment of his daughter. Id. 
218. Id. at 541, 332 A.2d at 13. 
219. Id. at 542, 332 A.2d at 14. This case was brought under a "negligent" failure to 
warn theory. Id. at 542-43,332 A.2d at 14-15. Strict liability was not recognized by 
the court of appeals until approximately one year later. See Phipps v. General Mo-
tors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 353, 363 A.2d 955, 963 (1976); see also supra notes 16-18 
and accompanying text. 
220. Moran, 273 Md. at 543,332 A.2d at 15 (citing 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW 
OF TORTS § 28.3 (1956) and W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 31 (4th ed. 1971)). 
221. Moran, 273 Md. at 543,332 A.2d at 15 (citing 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW 
OF TORTS § 28.3 (1956) and W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 31 (4th ed. 1971)). 
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warning of latent dangers. 222 
To determine when the duty to warn arises, the court focused on 
section 388, which has been recognized as the general principle regarding 
duty to warn in Maryland.223 The court noted that a manufacturer's 
duty to warn of latent dangers associated with its product extends "be-
yond the precise use contemplated by the producer and extends to all 
those which are reasonably foreseeable."224 A manufacturer is not liable 
for failure to warn when its product is mishandled or used in an unusual 
and unforeseeable manner.225 The court stressed that the standard for 
determining whether a particular use is reasonably foreseeable is vague at 
best;226 therefore, the reasonableness of a particular use is usually re-
solved by the trier offact.227 One reason for the difficulty in determining 
what constitutes a reasonably foreseeable use is that a manufacturer may 
be required to anticipate uses of its product other than the intended 
use.228 The law does not go so far as to require that the exact sequence of 
222. Moran, 273 Md. at 543-44, 332 A.2d at 15. 
223. Id. at 544, 332 A.2d at 15 (citing Twombley v. Fuller Brush Co., 221 Md. 476, 158 
A.2d 110 (1960) and Katz v. Arundel-Brooks Concrete Corp., 220 Md. 200, 151 
A.2d 731 (1959». 
224. Moran, 273 Md. at 545, 332 A.2d at 15-16 (citations omitted). 
225. Id. at 545, 332 A.2d at 16 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 com-
ment j (1965». Comment j states: 
The liability stated in this Section is limited to persons who are endan-
gered and the risks which are created in the course of uses of the chattel 
which the manufacturer should reasonably anticipate . . . . [HJe is not 
subject to liability when it is safe for all such [normal] uses, and harm re-
sults only because it is mishandled in a way which he has no reason to ex-
pect, or is used in some unusual and unforeseeable manner. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 comment j (1965) (emphasis added). 
226. Moran, 273 Md. at 549-50, 332 A.2d at 18. 
227. Id. at 546-47, 332 A.2d at 16-17; see Twombley v. Fuller Brush Co., 221 Md. 476, 
158 A.2d 110 (1960). Twombley involved an action for damages arising from an 
illness caused by the plaintiff's use of a spot remover. Id. at 481-84, 158 A.2d at 
111-14. The court was not confronted with the issue of what constitutes a "reason-
able use" because the product in question was being used in its intended manner. 
Id. at 481, 158 A.2d at 111-12. The court did note, however, that it was for ajury to 
decide whether the manufacturer knew or should have known that the spot remover 
was dangerous when used as intended, and whether the warning of the danger was 
adequate. Id. at 494, 158 A.2d at 119. Compare Katz v. Arundel-Brooks Concrete 
Corp., 220 Md. 200, 151 A.2d 731 (1959). In Katz, a manufacturer of ready-mix 
concrete was sued for injuries sustained by the plaintiff while cementing his base-
ment floor. Id. at 201-03, 151 A.2d at 732. The plaintiff performed the work with-
out protecting himselffrom the caustic chemicals contained in the cement. Id. The 
court of appeals upheld the trial court's conclusion that, as a matter of law, the 
manufacturer had no duty to warn because the caustic character of cement is known 
to builders, the normal purchasers and users of the cement. Id. at 204, 151 A.2d at 
733. The court noted that the manufacturer was not liable for failing to warn be-
cause the danger was in the realm of common knowledge among professionals who 
use the product, and because the manufacturer has the right to rely on that knowl-
edge. Id. at 204-05, 151 A.2d at 733-34. 
228. Moran, 273 Md. at 546, 332 A.2d at 16 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 395 comment k (1965». Comment k states: "The manufacturer may, how-
ever, reasonably anticipate other uses than the one for which the chattel is primarily 
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events leading up to, and resulting in, the injury be foreseeable; however, 
there will be liability where the injury suffered falls within a "general 
field of danger" that is reasonably foreseeable to the manufacturer.229 
The court concluded that a manufacturer has a duty to warn: 
[I]f the item it produces has an inherent and hidden danger 
about which the producer knows, or should know, could be a 
substantial factor in bringing injury to an individual or his 
property when the manufacturer's product comes near to or in 
contact with the elements which are present normally in the 
environment where the product can reasonably be expected to 
be brought or used.230 
It is not necessary that the manufacturer foresee the exact manner in 
which the injury occurs, it is "only necessary that it be foreseeable to the 
producer that its product, while in its normal environment, may be 
brought near a catalyst, likely to be found in that environment, which 
can untie the chattel's inherent danger."231 The Moran court ultimately 
held that the trial court's granting of a judgment n.o.v. for the manufac-
turer was improper because the plaintiffs produced sufficient evidence for 
the trier of fact to conclude that Faberge knew or should have known 
that its cologne was a potentially dangerous flammable product, and that 
Faberge could reasonably foresee that in the environment where the 
product is normally used (e.g., the plaintiff's friend's home) the cologne 
might be exposed to an open flame causing the cologne to ignite with 
such intensity that it would injure persons or property nearby.232 The 
court further held that because the evidence produced by the plaintiffs 
was sufficient to support these conclusions, the manufacturer should 
have warned potential users of the cologne's latent flammability 
characteristic.233 
In Moran, the Court of Appeals of Maryland established the general 
rule regarding a manufacturer's liability for negligent failure to warn. 
Despite Maryland's adoption of section 402A strict liability in 1976,234 
recent cases continue to cite Moran as the rule of law regarding a manu-
intended. The maker of a chair, for example, may reasonably expect that someone 
will stand on it. . . ." 
229. Moran, 273 Md. at 551-52, 332 A.2d at 19 (quoting Segerman v. Jones, 256 Md. 
109, 132,259 A.2d 794, 805 (1969) and McLeod v. Grant County School Dist., 42 
Wash.2d 316, 321, 255 P.2d 360,363 (1953»; see also F. HARPER, A TREATISE ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS § 7 (1933). 
230. Moran, 273 Md. at 552, 332 A.2d at 20 (citations omitted). 
231. Id. at 552-53, 332 A.2d at 20. The court, quoting the language used by the Supreme 
Court of Missouri, stated that "[i]f there is some probability of harm sufficiently 
serious that ordinary men would take precautions to avoid it, then failure to do so is 
negligence." Id. at 553, 332 A.2d at 20 (quoting Bean v. Ross Mfg. Co., 344 S.W.2d 
18, 25 (Mo. 1961». 
232. Moran, 273 Md. at 553-54, 332 A.2d at 20. 
233. Id. at 554, 332 A.2d at 21. 
234. See Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976); see also 
supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. 
1986] The Sophisticated User Defense 305 
facturer's duty to warn, even where the claim is based on section 402A 
strict liability failure to warn. For example, in American Laundry Ma-
chinery Industries v. Horan,235 the plaintiff brought a products liability 
suit, based on both negligence and strict liability theories, against the 
manufacturer of an institutional clothes dryer to recover for injuries sus-
tained when the dryer exploded while being used to dry a hot air bal-
100n.236 Even though the jury returned a verdict against the 
manufacturer on the basis of both negligence and strict liability,237 the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland discussed the manufacturer's duty 
to warn solely in terms of section 388 negligent failure to warn, as set 
forth in Moran. 238 Consequently, the court stated that the pertinent in-
quiry was whether the injury fell within the general field of danger so 
that it was reasonably foreseeable. 239 The theory of strict liability was 
not considered.24O 
Similarly, in Virgil v. HKash N' Karry" Service Corp.,241 the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland reaffirmed the duty to warn standard estab-
lished in Moran. 242 The court noted that a manufacturer has a duty to 
warn if the product has a latent danger of which the manufacturer 
knows, or should know, could cause an injury to the user of the product; 
the duty extends beyond just the intended use to include all reasonably 
foreseeable uses.243 Once again, the court failed to discuss the manufac-
turer's duty to warn in terms of a section 402A strict liability theory.244 
It is unclear whether Maryland courts will be willing to analyze a 
manufacturer's duty to warn under a section 402A strict liability theory. 
Since the adoption of section 402A strict liability by the court of appeals 
235. 45 Md. App. 97, 412 A.2d 407 (1980). 
236. [d. at 98-99, 412 A.2d at 410-11. 
237. [d. at 101, 412 A.2d at 411. 
238. [d. at 101-08, 412 A.2d at 411-15. 
239. [d. at 104, 412 A.2d at 413. 
240. [d. at 108-09, 412 A.2d at 415. The court concluded that the manufacturer's con-
tentions that strict liability is unconstitutional and inapplicable to this case were 
moot. [d. 
241. 61 Md. App. 23, 484 A.2d 652 (1984). A products liability action was brought 
against a manufacturer and a seller of a thermos for injuries sustained by the plain-
tiff when the thermos imploded while the plaintiff was pouring milk into it. [d. at 
27, 484 A.2d at 654. The court of special appeals held that the trial court erred in 
granting a directed verdict in favor of the defendants as to the strict liability and 
breach of warranty claims, but that there was no error in granting a directed verdict 
in favor of the defendants as to the negligence claim. [d. at 34, 484 A.2d at 658. 
242. [d. at 33-34, 484 A.2d at 657-58. 
243. [d. at 32, 484 A.2d at 657. The plaintiffs argued that because the label on the ther-
mos warned that the product contained glass and should not be used by children, an 
inference should have been drawn that the "manufacturer had reason to know that 
the thermos would be inherently dangerous for a reasonably foreseeable use." [d. at 
34, 484 A.2d at 657. The court held, however, that knowledge that the thermos 
contained glass, which is breakable, in no way constitutes knowledge that the ther-
mos was defective by reason of the alleged unreasonably dangerous characteristic. 
[d. at 34, 484 A.2d at 657-58. 
244. [d. The court did discuss section 402A with regard to manufacturing and design 
defects. [d. at 29-33, 484 A.2d at 655-56. 
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in Phipps v. General Motors,245 there should be little doubt that strict 
liability failure to warn is a viable cause of action in Maryland.246 Recent 
cases, however, such as American Laundry and Kash N' Karry, indicate 
that whether a failure to warn claim is brought under section 388 or 
section 402A, a manufacturer's duty to warn will be analyzed under a 
section 388 negligence theory as set forth in Moran. Therefore, cases 
such as American Laundry and Kash N' Karry suggest that under Mary-
land law there is no substantial difference between section 388 negligent 
failure to warn and section 402A strict liability failure to warn. 
The Fourth Circuit, applying Maryland law, reached the same con-
clusion.247 In Werner v. Upjohn Co., 248 the plaintiff brought suit against 
Upjohn, a drug manufacturer, for negligent and strict liability failure to 
warn.249 The jury found Upjohn negligent in failing to properly warn of 
the side effects of a drug. The jury determined, however, that Upjohn 
was not strictly liable for marketing an unreasonably dangerous prod-
uct.250 Upjohn appealed the jury's award of $400,000 in damages.25\ 
The Fourth Circuit held that the admission of certain evidence at 
trial constituted reversible error;252 therefore, the jury award was vacated 
and the case remanded for a new trial. 253 In discussing whether evidence 
of subsequent remedial measures should be inadmissible in a products 
liability case,254 the court noted that any theoretical difference between a 
negligent failure to warn claim and a strict liability failure to warn claim 
should have little effect on the admissibility of evidence of subsequent 
remedial measures.255 
In reaching the conclusion that evidence of subsequent remedial 
measures is inadmissible in strict liability actions, as well as in negligence 
actions,256 the court noted that a close similarity exists between the theo-
ries of negligence and strict liability.257 The court stated that any distinc-
245. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. 
246. [d. 
247. Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 857 (4th Cir. 1980). 
248. [d. 
249. [d. at 851. The suit also contained claims against Upjohn for negligently marketing 
the drug and for breach of certain alleged warranties. [d. The suit involved the 
drug "Cleocin," a broad spectrum antibiotic. [d. This drug was first approved for 
use by the Food and Drug Administration in 1970, and it soon became a popular 
alternative antibiotic for individuals who were allergic to penicillin. [d. As the use 
of Cleocin became more widespread, Upjohn began to receive reports of side effects, 
such as diarrhea and colitis. /d. 
250. /d. The jury also found Upjohn negligent in marketing the drug, and it found that 
Upjohn breached its warranties to the opthalmologist, a co-defendant. [d. The jury 
further found that the opthalmologist was negligent for prescribing the drug. [d. 
251. [d. The opthalmologist also appealed the jury's verdict. [d. 
252. [d. at 853. 
253. [d. at 860. 
254. [d. at 854-60. 
255. [d. at 857. 
256. [d. at 857-58. 
257. [d. at 858. The court stated, "[t]he elements of both are the same with the exception 
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tion between negligence and strict liability lessens in failure to warn cases 
because "it is clear that strict liability adds little" in failure to warn 
cases.258 The court further noted that the issue in failure to warn cases· 
under either theory is essentially the same: Whether the warning was 
adequate?259 If the Fourth Circuit is correct in its conclusion that under 
Maryland law there is little significant difference between negligent and 
strict liability failure to warn actions, the sophisticated user defense is a 
valid defense in failure to warn actions in Maryland.26O 
Such a conclusion, however, may be too simplistic. Any Maryland 
court simply could reject the dicta of Werner and hold that in a strict 
liability failure to warn suit, the "reasonableness" of the manufacturer's 
action is irrelevant. Under this analysis, the court would reject the so-
phisticated user defense. Nevertheless, because the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland continually has analyzed failure to warn cases in terms of the 
negligence principles set forth in Moran, and, because the Fourth Circuit 
has concluded that under Maryland law strict liability adds little to negli-
gence in a failure to warn action, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
sophisticated user defense is valid in Maryland. 
IV. PROPOSAL: ELIMINATION OF STRICT LIABILITY 
FAILURE TO WARN 
It is unlikely that courts will reach a consensus as to whether there 
is any significant difference between section 402A failure to warn and 
section 388 failure to warn. One solution is to eliminate strict liability 
failure to warn as a cause of action in products liability cases.26 \ Strict 
liability failure to warn no longer is recognized as a viable cause of action 
in Ohio.262 In Knitz v. Minister Machine Co. ,263 the Ohio Supreme Court 
that in negligence plaintiff must show a breach of a duty of care by defendant while 
in strict liability plaintiff must show the product was unreasonably dangerous." Id. 
258. /d. (citing Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377, 381 (D. Md. 1975), 
a./J'd, 567 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1977); Smith v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 273 N.E.2d 
476, 480 (Mich. 1979); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 99, at 659 n.73 (4th ed. 
1971». The court determined that "[u]nder a negligence theory the issue is whether 
the defendant exercised due care in formulating and updating the warning, while 
under a strict liability theory the issue is whether the lack of a proper warning made 
the product unreasonably dangerous." Id. The court concluded that because the 
issue is substantially the same under a negligence or strict liability theory, "a deci-
sion which admits evidence of subsequent remedial measures on a strict liability 
theory in a failure to warn case involving an unreasonably dangerous drug would 
promote substance over form and subvert the policy behind excluding evidence of 
subsequent remedial measures." Id. 
259. Werner, 628 F.2d at 858. 
260. See generally supra notes 118-33, 192-95 and accompanying text. 
261. See, e.g., Overbee v. VanWaters & Rogers, 706 F.2d 768 (6th Cir. 1983) (Ohio no 
longer recognizes a cause of action in strict liability failure to warn); Knitz v. Minis-
ter Mach. Co., 69 Ohio St. 2d 460, 432 N.E.2d 814 (same), cert. denied sub nom. 
Cincinnati Milacoon Chern., Inc. v. Blankenship, 459 U.S. 857 (1982); Temple v. 
Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977) (same). 
262. See supra note 261 and accompanying text. 
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noted that it is "apparent that the rule imposing obligation on the manu-
facturer or seller to give suitable warning of a dangerous propensity of a 
product is a rule fixing a standard of care, and any tort resulting from the 
failure to meet this duty is, in essence, a negligent act."264 Based on this 
language, Ohio courts have concluded that in failure to warn actions, 
plaintiffs are limited to a negligence theory because strict liability failure 
to warn is no longer recognized under the law of Ohio.265 
The elimination of strict liability failure to warn as a cause of action 
in products liability cases serves two purposes: (1) it resolves the debate 
as to whether there is any distinction between a manufacturer's duty to 
warn under theories of negligence or strict liability; and (2) it makes clear 
that the sophisticated user defense is a valid defense in all failure to warn 
cases. Moreover, its abrogation leaves intact for injured consumers a 
cause of action in strict liability for both design and manufacturing de-
fects, and leaves injured consumers an adequate cause of action under a 
negligence theory in failure to warn cases. This elimination would help 
courts in their continuing struggle to balance the interests of injured con-
sumers and manufacturers and would make the law regarding a manu-
facturer's duty to warn more uniform throughout the United States. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The sophisticated user defense provides manufacturers with an addi-
tional defense in products liability failure to warn cases. The doctrine is 
based on the theory that manufacturers have no duty to warn profes-
sional users, or their employees, because those users have the sophisti-
cated knowledge to understand any risks associated with use of the 
product. "The linchpin inquiry in application of the sophisticated user 
defense is whether or not the purchaser is a sophisticated user, thereby 
obviating the duty to warn."266 Courts are in disagreement, however, as 
to the validity of this defense in strict liability failure to warn cases. 
Some courts have determined that, although there may be a theoret-
ical difference between a manufacturer's duty to warn under a strict lia-
bility theory (as set forth in section 402A) and a manufacturer's duty to 
warn under general negligence principles (as embodied in section 388), as 
a practical matter, there is little, if any, distinction between the two. 
These courts reason that the analysis required under both theories in-
volves the resolution of the same issue: whether a manufacturer acted 
263. 69 Ohio St. 2d 460, 432 N.E.2d 814, cert. denied sub nom. Cincinnati Milacoon 
Chern., Inc. v. Blankenship, 459 U.S. 857 (1982). 
264. Knitz, 69 Ohio St. at 466 n.5, 432 N.E.2d at 818 n.5 (quoting Temple v. Wean 
United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 325, 364 N.E.2d 267, 272-73 (1977». 
265. Knitz, 69 Ohio St. at 466 n.5, 432 N.E.2d at 818 n.5; see also Overbee, 706 F.2d at 
770 (the Sixth Circuit upheld the trial court's granting of a directed verdict in favor 
of the defendant manufacturer as to the plaintiffs' strict liability failure to warn 
claims). 
266. Berg, Courts Diverge on "Sophisticated User," Prod. Liab. Newsletter, Nov. 1984, at 
1. 
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reasonably and with due care under all the circumstances in warning 
users of any potential dangers associated with use of a product. It is 
these courts that recognize the sophisticated user defense based on the 
theory that a jury could find that it was not unreasonable for a manufac-
turer to fail to warn a user of its product where the user has sophisticated 
knowledge of the dangers associated with use of that product. In such 
instances, the manufacturer's failure to warn is not the proximate cause 
of the user's injuries; rather, the proximate cause is the user's failure to 
heed his own sophisticated knowledge. 
Other courts have rejected the sophisticated user defense, determin-
ing that there is a distinction between negligent failure to warn and strict 
liability failure to warn. Although these courts recognize the validity of 
the sophisticated user defense in negligence actions, these courts rt~ason 
that in strict liability the focus is on the dangerousness of the product 
that is sold without an adequate warning; therefore, the knowledge of the 
user is irrelevant. Thus, these courts hold that the sophisticated user 
defense is inapplicable to strict liability failure to warn cases. 
It is unlikely that courts will ever reach a consensus as to which of 
these divergent analyses are correct. One solution is to dispose of strict 
liability failure to warn as a cause of action in products liability cases. 
This change, combined with the adoption of the sophisticated user de-
fense, would serve better to balance the competing interests of individuals 
seeking compensation for injuries caused by products and of manufactur-
ers in producing and marketing products valuable to society. 
Christopher P. Downs 
